

Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Glory LLC, et al.
U.S. District Court (D. Ariz.)
Case No. 2:26-cv-05387-SPL

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF TEMPORARY RECEIVER

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I.

INTRODUCTION

I, Thomas W. McNamara, was appointed temporary receiver of the Receivership Entities by the Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 18, “TRO”) entered August 4, 2026. TRO Section XX directs that I report to the Court on five specific topics¹ prior to the Preliminary Injunction hearing.

Our review to date has confirmed the basic components of the Receivership Entities’ credit repair operation: customers are primarily acquired by deceptively redirecting consumers’ internet searches for debt collectors to Defendants’ telemarketers, who are instructed and trained not to dispel consumers’ impressions they have reached the debt collectors; sales reps aggressively pitch the benefits of enrollment in their credit repair plans to consumers as a better option than paying the debt; unlawful advance fees are collected before credit repair is completed, in violation of applicable law; and consumers are subjected to undisclosed fees, often recurring monthly.

As detailed below at Section IV, it is my judgment that this business cannot operate legally and profitably. As authorized by Section XII.U of the TRO, I have therefore suspended operations.

II.

STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT TRO

A. Immediate Access to Control and Preserve Assets and Documents

The TRO² authorizes immediate access to “Receivership Premises” and to other locations, including personal residences, where Receivership assets and documents are located. For this business which operates with remote employees, cloud-based data platforms, and no physical headquarters, immediate access was minimally productive.

¹ The topics are: (1) steps taken to implement the TRO; (2)-(3) the value of Receivership Entities’ assets and the sum of their liabilities; (4) future steps to prevent any diminution of assets, pursue assets from third parties, and adjust liabilities; and (5) whether the business can be operated lawfully and profitably.

² TRO Section XXI.

1 1. Receivership Premises

2 The business of the Receivership Entities is complex and substantial (net sales of
3 \$199 million), and it employs approximately 500 people who perform myriad functions,
4 but it has no actual commercial office. Employees operate from their homes across the
5 country (or world) and communicate via laptops and cloud-based data platforms.
6 Individual Defendant Alexander Brola, the majority owner, mastermind, and boss,
7 appears to operate from a revolving series of rental homes in California and Arizona.
8 The other four Individual Defendants operate from homes in Oklahoma and Virginia, and
9 locations in Serbia and New Zealand.

10 While we did not locate any physical headquarters, we did identify and access
11 three virtual offices/mail drops in the Richmond, Virginia area.

12 Standard Scores LLC

13 The only active commercial Receivership Premises we located is a one-room
14 office at a Regus office location in a Richmond suburb (3900 Westerre Parkway,
15 Richmond, VA). This was leased in November 2024 by Individual Defendant Joshua
16 Curtis in the name of Standard Scores LLC. While this was a physical office, it
17 functioned solely as a mail drop for Standard Scores.

18 After clearance from Regus's counsel, the Receiver's team³ gained access to this
19 space on the afternoon of August 6, 2026. We found an empty room with three empty
20 desks, empty file cabinets, no computers or electronics, and stacks of mail. Regus staff
21 advised that Mr. Curtis was the only person with whom they had interacted, but he never
22 came to the office or opened the mail. When the mailbox overflowed, Regus staff moved
23 the mail to the office.

24 On August 7, 2026, we collected all the mail and confirmed arrangements with
25 Regus to deny further access to Curtis. The mail was primarily chargeback notices from
26

27 _____
28 ³ The Receiver's team in Richmond consisted of counsel, a legal analyst, and a digital
forensics vendor.

1 merchant processors which provided credit card processing services to Standard Scores,
2 customer disputes and complaints, and inquiries from state regulators.

3 Sphinx Investments LLC

4 On April 7, 2026, the Receiver's team also visited a second Regus office in
5 downtown Richmond (919 East Main Street, Suite 1000) – this address had been used by
6 “Sphinx Investments, LLC,” which lists Curtis as its CEO and has ties to Individual
7 Defendants Brola and Emery. We confirmed that Sphinx was previously a tenant, but
8 Mr. Curtis terminated the contract in October 2025.

9 Sphinx Investments is not named a Receivership Entity in the TRO. However,
10 after investigation, other Sphinx-related entities were named Additional Receivership
11 Entities as provided in TRO (discussed below). The parties have not challenged these
12 designations.

13 UPS Store Used by Defendant Curtis for Business

14 On August 7, 2026, the Receiver's team also secured access to a mailbox at a UPS
15 Store in Richmond, Virginia which we understood Curtis had used for various
16 businesses.⁴ The store owner provided us with the mail, and we confirmed arrangements
17 to deny further access to Curtis pursuant to the requirements of the TRO. There was
18 limited mail, suggesting that Curtis had recently accessed the mailbox. The mail we did
19 find was addressed to Curtis for Sphinx Investments and other LLCs associated with
20 Curtis.

21 2. Personal Residences

22 Beginning at 8 a.m. (PDT) on August 6, 2026, the Receiver's team coordinated
23 simultaneous immediate access efforts at the residences of the Individual Defendants
24 believed to reside in the U.S. – Alexander Brola in Arizona, David Naylor in Oklahoma,
25 and Joshua Curtis in Virginia – and one key employee – Mark Squires (former Chief
26

27 _____
28 ⁴ We first visited this site in the afternoon of August 6, but the store owner requested a
subpoena to expedite the process, which we provided on August 7.

1 Technology Officer) in North Carolina. In general, these efforts were frustrating and not
2 immediately productive.

3 Alexander Brola Residence

4 Brola was believed to reside and conduct business at a house on Desert Lane in
5 Phoenix, Arizona. The Receiver's team⁵ appeared there at 8 a.m. (PT).

6 When there was no response to the Ring doorbell, the Receiver's representative
7 called three phone numbers associated with Brola⁶ and sent an email to Brola with a copy
8 of the TRO. We received no response to the calls or the email.

9 Before the team departed this site, we learned fortuitously that the house appeared
10 to be owned by Brola's brother, Brian Rodricks, and that Rodricks had been inside the
11 house all along. Rodricks eventually emerged from the home, only to tell us that he
12 would not talk to us and that Brola did not live there.

13 David Naylor Residence

14 The Receiver's team⁷ appeared at 10:10 a.m. (CDT) at a residence on 163rd Street
15 in Edmond, Oklahoma where David Naylor was believed to reside and conduct business.
16 No one responded to the doorbell and no cars were in the garage.

17 After a short wait, the Receiver reached Naylor on his cell phone – Naylor said he
18 had just departed for a family trip to Arkansas but was only 15 minutes out and would
19 return to the house. By 2 p.m., he had not returned, and the Receiver's team departed.

20 _____
21 ⁵ The Receiver's team in Phoenix consisted of counsel, a digital forensics vendor, and a
22 forensic accountant. Also present were FTC counsel and a process server retained by the
23 FTC.

24 ⁶ The numbers were (1) a 480 area code number with automated call screening where a
25 voicemail was left advising of the FTC action, the TRO, and the duty to cooperate; (2) a
26 844 area code number which led to a Credit Glory saleswoman who was likewise advised
of the FTC action, the TRO, and Brola's duty to cooperate, but who did not appear to
recognize Brola's name and said her supervisor would have to check with management;
and (3) a 602 area code number which appeared to have been answered by Brola, who
said he was taking down the information, but the connection was poor and the response
could possibly have been a recording and/or some sort of AI response.

27 ⁷ The Receiver's team in Edmond included the Receiver, the deputy receiver, and a
28 digital forensics vendor. Also present were FTC counsel, a FTC digital forensics expert,
and a process server retained by the FTC.

1 Before departing, the Receiver emailed the TRO to Naylor and counsel believed to have
2 represented the Receivership Entities in the past. The Receiver also made three
3 additional calls to Naylor's cell phone (all went to voicemail) and left messages detailing
4 Naylor's duty to cooperate under the TRO, the potential for an OSC re Contempt Motion
5 to be filed against him, and the critical importance of his provision of administrative
6 passwords to the multiple data platforms utilized by Receivership Entities. He never
7 returned those calls or provided passwords.

8 Joshua Curtis Residence

9 At 11 a.m. (EDT), the Receiver's team arrived at a residential address in Virginia
10 (Welwyn Road, Henrico, VA) which Individual Defendant Joshua Curtis had used as a
11 business address. We learned from the current occupant that Curtis sold the house in
12 May 2026 and no longer lived there. The team then travelled to the home of Curtis's
13 mother-in-law located (Commodore Point, Midlothian, VA) which we also understood
14 Curtis had used to conduct business. Over several hours, no one answered the doorbell
15 there.

16 Our team continued its efforts to reach Curtis throughout the day through various
17 means: emailed him at six separate associated email addresses; made multiple calls and
18 texts to his cell phone (but the voicemail was full so we were unable to leave a message);
19 sent texts to his cell phone; and called multiple phone numbers associated with
20 Receivership Entity Standard Scores.⁸ Curtis did not respond to any of this outreach.

21 //

22 //

23 //

24
25 ⁸ An 833-area code number was an automated line, which did not lead to a real person.
26 However, an 888-area code number was also automated, but ultimately led to a
27 conversation with a representative ("Stephen") who said he would check with his
28 supervisor ("Milo"); when the supervisor called back, he provided no substantive
information and instead instructed us to send an email to
customerservice@standardscores.com, noting in the process that he was working
remotely from Europe.

1 Mark Squires Residence

2 Beginning at approximately 11 a.m. (EDT), the Receiver's team⁹ travelled to two
3 residential locations in Charlotte, North Carolina where Mark Squires, identified as the
4 present or former Chief Technology Officer ("CTO") of Standard Scores, was believed to
5 reside and conduct business. At the first home on Alijon Court, there was no response.
6 At the second home on Bainbridge Road, the occupant advised that he was renting from
7 Squires and provided Squires' phone number; we later learned that he also advised
8 Squires that someone was looking for him.

9 At approximately noon, our team called Squires and left a voicemail advising him
10 of the FTC action and the TRO, followed by an email enclosing copies of the Complaint
11 and TRO. Squires promptly called back – he agreed to be interviewed and invited the
12 team back to the Alijon Court home where we met for approximately two hours. He
13 responded to our questions and permitted the FTC digital forensics professional to begin
14 forensic imaging a desktop computer he used for Credit Glory, Standard Scores, Europa
15 Eats, and most recently Sphinx Consulting LLC.

16 About two hours in, Squires excused himself to speak with an attorney secured by
17 his wife. He told us he emailed a copy of the TRO to the attorney. At the attorney's
18 instruction, he then terminated the interview, revoked his consent to the computer
19 imaging, and threatened to call 911 if we did not leave. He also requested our interview
20 notes and the return of any imaged data. We declined to provide our notes but agreed not
21 to review any imaged data on a temporary basis until he had the opportunity to discuss
22 with counsel.¹⁰

23
24 _____
25 ⁹ The Receiver's team consisted of counsel and a legal analyst. Also present was an FTC
digital forensics expert.

26 ¹⁰After consultations with his counsel, Squires later continued his cooperation, and
27 agreed to permit access to some information. Squires' counsel arranged to forensically
28 image the desktop computer, two external hard drives, and two mobile phones. Squires'
counsel has provided some Receivership Entity documents and stated more are
forthcoming.

1 Despite the abrupt end to our interview, Squires provided background information
2 about Individual Defendant Brola and the Receivership Entities' business. He first
3 interacted with Brola in 2008 when both were internet gamer enthusiasts.¹¹ In February
4 2023 Brola hired him to be the CTO of Credit Glory, build Standard Scores, manage the
5 IT team, and build a custom customer relationship management ("CRM") database.¹²

6 As to the credit repair business, Squires confirmed that the sales reps all worked
7 remotely and were managed via Discord, a text, voice call, and video platform.¹³ He
8 stated that the phone numbers that Receivership Entities included in Google ads, which
9 consumers could click on and be connected with a Receivership Entity, were run through
10 a third-party platform, Twilio. The homegrown CRM was hosted by DigitalOcean and
11 replicated for each of the four consumer-facing credit repair companies, and was
12 accessible through the websites of each company.

13 As to Standard Scores, Squires learned that Brola formed it to source consumer
14 credit reports rather than pay commissions to third parties to perform the same service.¹⁴
15 Standard Scores charged consumers just \$1 to access their credit reports, even though it
16 cost Standard Scores \$8-\$11. This "discount" is recovered by multiple other fees charged
17 for credit repair. As detailed below, this \$1 fee was also a teaser to get consumers to
18 share their credit card information.

19 Squires left Standard Scores in January 2025 for a job in the financial sector. He
20 stated he had grown "uncomfortable" with the business. He did not like the basic format

21 ¹¹ Squires was looking to improve in the Starcraft internet game when he found a Brola
22 website (HotKeyit) that trained people in Starcraft.

23 ¹² Squires said he accepted the job only after Brola met his demand for a big advance; he
24 made that demand because he had never met Brola in person, did not totally trust him,
and found it "unusual" that Brola communicated via Signal with messages set to
disappear after four weeks.

25 ¹³ Squires told us that Discord even had a "bathroom" channel enabling managers to track
26 which employees were on restroom breaks.

27 ¹⁴ The prior provider was a third-party vendor, Identity IQ, which offered consumers a
28 seven-day trial for \$1 allowing them to access credit reports from the three credit
agencies, with the access (and charges) continuing for an annual, biannual, or monthly
basis.

1 – purchase ads in the name of or similar to debt collectors and when consumers tried to
2 contact the debt collector, redirecting them to a Brola business. Squires was also
3 influenced by a recorded customer call he heard where he felt the consumer was being
4 scammed.¹⁵ When he expressed some concerns to Brola, Brola replied, “it’s all legal,”
5 “we’re selling the idea to customers that they can get away with something” and asked
6 Squires, “Why do you care if you lie to strangers?”

7 When Squires’ new financial job did not work out, Squires returned in October
8 2025 as CTO for a new Brola project – Europa Eats, a Door Dash type food delivery
9 business in Croatia, which Squires believed was funded from the credit repair business.
10 By May 2026, however, Brola terminated the Europa Eats project and moved Squires to
11 another project: Sphinx Consultants LLC (“Sphinx”), a new debt collection business that
12 Brola planned to integrate with the credit repair business. Individual Defendant David
13 Naylor was the point person on Sphinx but was still learning the business and seeking the
14 necessary certifications. Squires built the CRM.¹⁶ According to Squires, Sphinx had just
15 recently purchased its first batch of consumer debt and in July 2026 had sent out its first
16 round of letters to consumers. Brola terminated Squires from Sphinx in July 2026, with
17 August as his last month of employment.

18 **B. Documents/Information/Electronic Data**

19 Despite limited results from the immediate access, we ultimately identified and,
20 with considerable difficulty, accessed and secured the Receivership Entities electronic
21 services and data platforms, including: QuickBooks for accounting; Google Workspace
22 for email and cloud document storage; Close CRM (used minimally by Standard Scores)
23 and the homegrown CRMs on DigitalOcean; Twilio for telephone systems and call data

24 _____
25 ¹⁵ According to Squires, the consumer was a desperate woman in an abusive relationship
26 trying to clear a \$300 debt so she could rent an apartment for herself and her child. After
27 being diverted to one of Brola’s companies, the sales rep took payment of \$400
28 representing that this would clear the debt, when in fact no payment would be made to
the debt collector.

¹⁶ Even after he joined Sphinx, Squires was paid his salary from a Europa Eats bank
account. Squires also told us Brola still owes him for his last month’s salary at Sphinx.

1 management (Twilio has secured but not yet provided the data); four Slack workspaces
2 and one Discord server for real-time voice, video, and text communications; Justworks
3 for payroll; and more than 15 different merchant processing companies to process credit
4 card charges.¹⁷

5 This process was complicated by the unavailability and early lack of cooperation
6 from the Individual Defendants (*see* below), but we did ultimately secure administrator
7 credentials for almost all platforms. In coordination with our forensics vendor, FTC's
8 digital forensics team obtained forensic images of the data platforms.

9 While there was no physical office to secure and inspect, these electronic services
10 and platforms together constituted a full-service office, which has provided us with some
11 level of visibility into operations.

12 **C. Suspension of Business and Notice to Consumers**

13 On August 6, 2026, we contacted Twilio, the telephone and voicemail vendor,
14 about the FTC action, entry of the TRO, and the suspension of business, but Twilio did
15 not immediately respond. On August 12, Twilio suspended the accounts for Credit Clerk,
16 Credit Glory, Credit Joy, Credit Sage, and Standard Scores, and the telephone numbers
17 are no longer functioning. Twilio also identified approximately 55 TB of call recordings.
18 We remain in contact with the Twilio legal department. We have also posted a notice to
19 consumers at the Receiver's website: [https://regulatoryresolutions.com/case/federal-](https://regulatoryresolutions.com/case/federal-trade-commission-v-credit-glory-llc-et-al-credit-glory-receivership/)
20 [trade-commission-v-credit-glory-llc-et-al-credit-glory-receivership/](https://regulatoryresolutions.com/case/federal-trade-commission-v-credit-glory-llc-et-al-credit-glory-receivership/).

21 We contacted Namecheap, the domain host, to gain control of the various
22 websites. Defendants provided the website credentials so we could place a consumer
23 notice on each website to alert consumers to the FTC action, the TRO, and the suspension
24 of business. However, Namecheap locked the account and has not yet allowed us to
25 access it. Once we can access the account, we will modify the websites and provide the
26 link for further information about the FTC action.

27 ¹⁷ Since Brola used Signal to communicate with Squires, we requested all Signal
28 communications regarding the Receivership Entities. However, Defendants did not
provide any Signal communications.

1 **D. Cooperation**

2 While defense counsel has been exceptionally cooperative and responsive, the
3 Individual Defendants' cooperation has been piecemeal at best and has complicated and
4 slowed our efforts to gain control and review the various data sources and online
5 platforms. In many instances, we secured the necessary administrative credentials for the
6 data only after multiple requests.

7 For example, all four credit repair entities and Standard Scores used Google
8 Workspace for email and file sharing. The Defendants were obligated by the TRO to turn
9 over control of the data immediately via administrative password. Instead, Defendants
10 initially provided just standard user credentials, and it was only after multiple email
11 exchanges that we secured super-administrator credentials on August 8.¹⁸ In another
12 instance, Defendants denied on two separate occasions that Discord was used in the
13 business. The Receiver's counsel had been told about Discord by the former CTO and
14 also discovered emails referencing the Discord platform; after persistent requests,
15 Defendants ultimately admitted Discord was used in the operation and provided
16 credentials to access a Discord server, named "Aurora," which had only two text
17 channels – announcements and lunar-antics. There were audio-only huddle rooms and
18 offices.

19 We also secured QuickBooks and Slack files for the four credit repair entities and
20 Standard Scores.

21 All four of the credit repair entities used the custom CRM databases and software,
22 which were hosted at DigitalOcean. After several days and multiple emails with both
23 defense counsel and counsel for DigitalOcean, we secured administrative access to these
24 DigitalOcean accounts. The CRM software developer, an employee of Defendants, was
25 made available and explained the various items located on the DigitalOcean accounts.

26 ¹⁸ Credit Clerk had approximately 223 Google Workplace accounts totaling
27 approximately 820 GB. Credit Glory had approximately 236 accounts totaling
28 approximately 1 TB. Credit Joy had approximately 83 accounts totaling 1.1 TB. Credit
Sage had approximately 243 accounts totaling approximately 1 TB. Standard Scores had
approximately 37 accounts totaling 17 GB.

1 Across the four DigitalOcean accounts,¹⁹ each had a virtual server hosting the
2 CRM's user interface accessible via the internet (*i.e.*, <https://crm.creditclerk.com>;
3 <https://crm.creditglory.com>, etc.), CRM database, and customer files stored in cloud
4 storage. Credit Clerk, Credit Glory, and Credit Sage also had resources to "handwrite"
5 the dispute letters. On August 7, Defendants continued to access the CRM databases and
6 created a backup of them in violation of the TRO. We did not learn about that until
7 August 17 when Defendants' software developer identified for us that the CRM databases
8 had been backed up by Defendants on August 7. We ultimately were able to download
9 the CRM databases on August 18 and provided a copy to Defendants on August 19. The
10 CRM databases were approximately 40 GB. The CRM customer files were
11 approximately 9 TB, which we downloaded and made available to Defendants.

12 On August 14, we requested interviews of the Individual Defendants and an
13 outside bookkeeper. Individual Defendants Brola, Emery, and Naylor have not agreed to
14 be interviewed and, to date, the Receiver team has interviewed two Individual Defendants
15 and two employees, including: the software developer who provided an overview of the
16 various DigitalOcean resources and how each was used (August 17); an outside
17 bookkeeper and Individual Defendant Joshua Curtis, who were interviewed by the
18 Receiver's forensic accountant (August 19); Individual Defendant and CEO Marko
19 Petkovic, who was interviewed by the Receiver and his team for approximately two and a
20 half hours in connection with Petkovic's two declarations (August 23).

21 Additionally, on August 19, the Receiver requested Defendants comply with the
22 TRO (which requires repatriation within 5 days) and repatriate all Documents and Assets,
23 including, among other things, approximately \$4.65 million transferred to Brola's Swiss
24 bank account from Credit Sage's Brex account, as well as four wires sent to Brola on

25 ¹⁹ The credit repair companies' DigitalOcean databases are complex. The Credit Clerk
26 DigitalOcean account has one database cluster, eight virtual servers, and two storage
27 buckets. Credit Glory has four database clusters, twelve virtual servers, and four storage
28 buckets. Credit Joy has one application, four virtual servers, and one storage bucket.
Credit Sage has four database clusters, nineteen virtual servers, a load balancer and ten
storage buckets.

March 2, 2026 from Credit Glory and Credit Sage’s Brex account totaling \$1.15 million. On August 26, defense counsel claimed that the repatriation provision has not been triggered because Brola, Emery, and Petkovic are contesting personal jurisdiction and service of the TRO, among other things. Along the same lines, we have not received the devices of Brola, Emery, and Petkovic, all of which are required to be provided for imaging under the TRO.

E. Additional Receivership Entities

The TRO empowers the Receiver to identify additional Receivership Entities, and sets out a procedure to notify such non-parties and inform them they can challenge the Receiver’s designation.²⁰ We have identified Sphinx Consulting LLC, Sphinx Advisory Group LLC, and Europa Eats LLC as additional Receivership Entities and sent them the requisite notices. *See Exhibit 1.* We have received no challenge to these determinations.

III.

ASSETS AND LIABILITIES OF RECEIVERSHIP ENTITIES

A. Financial Accounts for Receivership Entities

Beginning August 6, 2026, my team served the TRO on banks and other financial institutions where Receivership Entities and/or Individual Defendants were known to have accounts. The following Receivership Entities’ accounts with positive balances have been frozen:

Defendants / Account Name	Bank / Merchant Vendor Name	Account No. Ending	Balance Frozen
Clerk Credit Software LLC	Ecrypt/Esquire Bank	9306	\$40,495.25

²⁰ TRO Definition L defines Receivership Entities as “the Corporate Defendants as well as any other entity that has conducted any business related to Defendants’ marketing of credit repair services, including receipt of Assets derived from any activity that is the subject of the Complaint in this matter, and that the Receiver determines is controlled or owned by any Defendant.” TRO Section XII.V provides that the Receiver may notify a non-party entity identified as a Receivership Entity and inform the entity that it can challenge the Receiver’s determination by filing a motion with the Court.

Defendants / Account Name	Bank / Merchant Vendor Name	Account No. Ending	Balance Frozen
Clerk Credit Software LLC	Mercury Technologies/ Choice Bank	0734 & 1738	\$2,797.04
Clerk Credit Systems LLC	Avidia Bank	9669	\$34,617.64
Clerk Credit Systems LLC	Luqra/Evolve Bank	6826	\$133,219.40
Clerk Credit Systems LLC	Mercury Technologies/ Choice Bank	1731 & 7341	\$45,908.72
Clerk Credit Systems LLC	Wise	4016	\$5.92
Credit Glory Inc.	Ecrypt/Esquire Bank	1865	\$157,309.90
Credit Glory Inc.	JPMorgan Chase	5906	\$2,225.00
Credit Glory LLC	Brex	6451	\$0.05
Credit Glory LLC	Brex	4193	\$0.10
Credit Glory LLC	Brex/Column NA	7214	\$165,423.09
Credit Glory LLC	Maverick/Avidia Bank	3250	\$24,236.00
Credit Glory LLC	PayArc/Evolve Bank	5236	\$90,164.49
Credit Glory LLC	PayArc/Evolve Bank	8552	\$96,975.61
Credit Sage LLC	Brex/Column NA	1162	\$0.16
Credit Sage LLC	Brex	1710	\$49,413.87
Credit Sage LLC	Brex/Column NA	7188	\$253,044.76
Credit Sage LLC	Coastal Acquiring Secure Holdings	5880	\$37,614.12
Credit Sage LLC	Coastal Acquiring Secure Holdings	9881	\$225,191.26
Credit Sage LLC	Coastal Acquiring Secure Holdings	0880	\$295,853.83
Credit Sage LLC	Maverick/Avidia Bank	9680	\$24,487.00
Credit Sage LLC	PayArc/Evolve Bank	8578	\$111,274.38

Defendants / Account Name	Bank / Merchant Vendor Name	Account No. Ending	Balance Frozen
Credit Sage LLC	Wise	3562	\$15.82
Europa Eats LLC	Mercury Technologies	0391 & 1850	\$1,705.46
Joy Credit Software LLC	Ecrypt	6880	\$84,898.33
Joy Credit Software LLC	Mercury Technologies/ Choice Bank	9596 & 3874	\$14,987.76
Joy Credit Software LLC dba Credit Joy	Netevia/Evolve Bank	1474	\$43,120.32
Sphinx Advisory Group	Mercury Technologies/ Choice Bank	6016 & 5736	\$1.67
Sphinx Consultants	Mercury Technologies/ Choice Bank	1642 & 1962	\$4,701.12
Standard Scores LLC	Ecrypt/Esquire Bank	0732	\$24,639.79
Standard Scores LLC	JPMorgan Chase	0704	\$446.33
Standard Scores LLC	Mercury Technologies/ Avidia Bank	2284 & 0187	\$1,811.47
Standard Scores LLC	PayArc/Evolve Bank	5942	\$238,893.84
Standard Scores LLC	Stripe	GGvx	\$317,497.09
Standard Scores LLC	Wise	8161	\$199.27
Total			\$2,523,175.86

B. Liabilities

Our financial review is ongoing, but our Accountant's Report, **Exhibit 2**, indicates current and long-term liabilities of \$31,683.

1 **C. Accounting**

2 Forensic accountant, Thad Meyer, has conducted a preliminary review of available
3 financial records of Receivership Entities, primarily QuickBooks Online. His interview
4 of the bookkeeper and Individual Defendant Josh Curtis (who claims to have been
5 providing CFO services) were not enlightening. Mr. Meyer's Accountant's Report is
6 **Exhibit 2**. This report is based on a review of Defendants' own internal records – we
7 have not conducted any sort of technical audit – hence our review and this report are
8 preliminary, but they provide an indication of financial activity. We provide an overview
9 here.

10 1. Sales of Credit Repair Services

11 From inception through July 2026, aggregate “sales” of credit repair services by
12 the consumer-facing Receivership Entities (Credit Clerk, Credit Glory, Credit Joy, Credit
13 Sage, and Standard Scores) were \$205,490,354 per the Receivership Entity QuickBooks
14 records. There are no chargeback or refund accounts in the Credit Glory and Credit Sage
15 records. Refunds, chargebacks, and processing fees appear to have been netted against
16 recorded sales; therefore, gross consumer collections were higher than the amounts
17 recorded.

18 The other Receivership Entities were not consumer-facing.

19 2. Profit/Loss

20 Of the 17 Receivership Entities, QuickBooks records were kept for only five of the
21 entities. The consolidated income of the five consumer-facing Receivership Entities
22 totals \$210,657,204.

23 3. Balance Sheet Assets and Liabilities

24 The five consumer-facing Receivership Entities consolidated assets as of July
25 2026 total \$984,907 and liabilities total \$31,683.

1 4. Distributions to Principals

2 From 2022 through early August 2026, there were distributions to the Individual
3 Defendants from the five Receivership Entities totaling \$58,149,554. The distributions
4 were recorded in QuickBooks as “Owner’s Pay.”

5 The Individual Defendants who received the largest distributions were Alexander
6 Brola, Liam Emery, and Marko Petkovic. Per the QuickBooks records, distributions to
7 Alexander Brola total \$54,798,745, Liam Emery received a total of \$4,665,324, and
8 Marko Petkovic received \$893,364. The QuickBooks records indicate that approximately
9 \$43 million of the total distribution was paid by Credit Glory and Credit Sage.

10 We found evidence of many wire transfers (including international wire transfers)
11 from the Credit Glory entities to Brola. These wires were made in large round numbers,
12 totaled in the millions of dollars, and appear to have been made regularly at the start of
13 each month.

14 IV.

15 **CAN THE BUSINESS BE OPERATED LEGALLY AND PROFITABLY?**

16 TRO Section XII.U authorizes the Receiver to suspend business operations if in
17 his judgment such operations cannot be continued legally and profitably.

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1 The TRO prohibits Defendants from three primary categories of unlawful conduct:
 2 unlawful advance fees;²¹ misrepresentations and false promises;²² and unlawful
 3 enrollment practices.²³ *See generally* Section TRO § I.²⁴

4 Our review of Defendants' multiple CRMs, email traffic, and employee
 5 communications on the Slack platform, even though preliminary, has provided us with a
 6 solid understanding of how this business operates. Based on our review to date, we have
 7 confirmed, at a minimum, the following unlawful components of the business: unlawful
 8 advance fees; misrepresentations and deception in the acquisition of customers, who are
 9 unknowingly redirected from their internet searches for their debt collector; sales reps
 10 who capitalize on consumer confusion during sales calls; and unlawful enrollment
 11 practices by failing to provide required consumer protection disclosures regarding
 12 contract terms and the collection of fees. As Receiver, I can see no path by which the
 13 business could be operated legally and profitably in the context of this receivership.

14 //

15 //

16 //

17 ²¹ This includes charging or receiving payment for credit repair services before the
 18 service is fully performed. *See* TRO § I(B).

19 ²² This specifically includes misrepresentations that: they are affiliated with a debt
 20 collector or creditor; they can remove negative information from a credit report or
 21 improve a credit score; any person is a victim of identity theft; or any other material fact
 regarding their credit repair services. *See id.* § I(A).

22 ²³ This specifically includes: false statements to secure a consumer's banking
 23 information; failure to include required terms and conditions in a Credit Repair Service
 24 contract; charging consumers without their informed consent; electronic fund transfers on
 a recurring basis without written authorization; and as to any negative option feature,
 failure to disclose that consumers will be charged unless they take affirmative action, the
 dates charges will be submitted and steps to avoid the charges. TRO §§ I(D-H).

25 ²⁴ Receivership Entities developed customized home-grown CRMs for each of the four
 26 credit repair entities and another for Standard Scores. These CRMs contain all the
 27 information and data necessary for complete visibility into operations, including sales rep
 28 scripts, policy statements, financial activity, specific customer activity, training materials
 and videos, some recorded phone calls with consumers, sales reports (including a "Hall
 of Fame" listing the top salespeople), and a wealth of other relevant information
 regarding consumers, including their credit reports, and contracts.

1 **A. Advance Fees**

2 1. Fees Collected

3 The business collects multiple fees – some are collected early in the enrollment
4 process; others are collected monthly over time. Our sample review of customer
5 accounts from the CRMs of Credit Glory, Credit Sage, Credit Clerk and Credit Joy
6 clarify the timeline of fee collections.

7 a. \$1 Standard Scores Fee

8 After a consumer is redirected, via Google ad, away from their actual internet
9 search target (a collection company), the consumer is connected to a sales rep who
10 downplays the value of paying the debt and sells disputing the debt as a real fix for the
11 consumer's situation. The first task in the sales process is to secure the consumer's credit
12 report from Standard Scores (a supposedly separate company). The sales rep quickly
13 seeks authorization to charge \$1 (charged in the name of Standard Scores) to access
14 credit reports from each of the three credit bureaus. *See Exhibit 3 at 2-3* ("Phase 3:
15 Standard Scores"). This maneuver achieves the collection of \$1 and – more importantly
16 – the consumer's credit card information for other fees. The \$1 is less than the \$8-\$11
17 Standard Scores pays to pull the credit report, but that discount is recaptured through the
18 \$24.99 monthly maintenance fees charged consumers via Standard Scores.

19 b. One-time Set Up Fee

20 After the credit reports are pulled, the initial call moves to the consumer's
21 enrollment in the credit repair plan, which requires a one-time set-up fee. The consumer
22 is reminded that paying the debt will not remove the debt from the consumer's credit
23 report (where the rep claims it will remain for seven years) and the only way to remove
24 the debt from the report is to dispute the debt.

25 In a section titled "Hook & Close," the sales script prompts sales reps to describe
26 this fee as follows: "To get everything started there's a one-time set-up fee of \$X78
27 which covers prepping and sending your first round of dispute letters within *24 hours*
28 *after authorized payment*. From there, we keep working on your file month-to-month,

1 which is just \$99 per month as we continue applying pressure until the job is done. Most
2 customers see results within 90 days and that is exactly why we give you the 90-day
3 guarantee.” See **Exhibit 3 at 4** (“Phase 5: Hook & Close”) (emphasis added).²⁵

4 Our review suggests that the set-up fee amount varies dramatically from \$178 to
5 \$978 and is highly negotiable. Sales reps are instructed to ask for higher amounts but are
6 authorized to offer discounts and/or modest payment plans based on ability to pay.²⁶ In
7 some instances, the amount is set at a small discount off the amount of debt at issue as
8 part of the deception that the debt will be resolved. Our review indicates no clear policy
9 guidelines for discounts on the set-up fee, except that sales reps were trained to make the
10 deal.

11 The sales rep initially puts a “Hold” on the customer’s credit card for the agreed
12 upon amount of the set-up fee.²⁷ Consumers are then sent instructions to upload their
13 photo ID and proof of address, after which dispute letters are generated (within 24 hours)
14 and sent electronically to a direct mail vendor for mailing. At the same time the
15 electronic letters are sent to the vendor, the credit card is charged the full amount of the
16 set-up fee. We understand the third-party vendor prints and mails the dispute letters to
17 the credit reporting agencies.²⁸

18
19
20 ²⁵ We have located ample customer complaints and cancellations based on claims that the
21 fees being charged were not explained. Indeed, some consumers complete the call
22 believing they have been speaking to the debt collector they attempted to contact in the
23 first instance. This does not appear to be result of rogue rep actions but was part of the
24 sales process the reps were trained to accomplish. See **Exhibit 3** (Credit Glory Training
25 Materials entitled, “Collections Call Flow”). See also discussion on complaints and
26 training videos below.

27 ²⁶ CEO Petkovic explained that experienced and successful sales reps, without
28 compliance issues, were granted the discretion to ask for whatever setup fee they could
get the consumer to pay.

²⁷ Our review of consumer calls indicates that it often takes numerous attempts to obtain
a hold. The CRM specifically notes that roughly 40-50% of holds fail, often due to
“Issuer Declined” (fraud protection) or “Insufficient Funds.”

²⁸ The printing and mailing does not necessarily occur instantaneously with the vendor’s
electronic receipt of the letters.

1 The process of first putting a hold on the card before later charging it appears to be
 2 an unsuccessful effort to avoid advance fee prohibitions against charges made before the
 3 work is “fully performed.”

4 c. Monthly Maintenance Fees

5 A \$99 monthly maintenance fee is first charged one month after the date the set-up
 6 fee is charged and then billed each month thereafter until cancellation. Despite some
 7 script language suggesting that it is only charged for 90 days, we have seen evidence that
 8 it recurs well beyond 90 days based on review of history of billing practices for numerous
 9 consumers in the CRMs.

10 d. Monthly Credit Monitoring Fees

11 A \$24.99 fee to Standard Scores is also collected monthly, ostensibly to monitor
 12 consumers’ credit reports. The first such fee is collected seven days after enrollment and
 13 thereafter monthly. Script language also limits this fee to 90 days, but in practice the
 14 charges recur much longer, as also evidenced by the billing records for numerous
 15 consumers contained in the CRMs.

16 e. Inquiry Disputes: Hard Inquiries

17 The business also engaged in limited efforts to remove “Hard Inquiries” from
 18 consumer credit reports. These were inquiries from lenders evaluating some sort of credit
 19 application and were generally treated by credit bureaus as a “hit” against the consumer’s
 20 credit. In our interview with Individual Defendant Petkovic, he confirmed the process for
 21 selling Inquiry Removal.²⁹

22 Towards the end of a sales call, and after the initial sale, sales reps could offer a
 23 separate service to challenge “hard inquiries.” Based on the sales script, the process was:
 24 by text message, the consumer was asked to review all hard inquiries; the sales rep
 25 offered to dispute them, explaining they were separate from debt accounts, but “can
 26 impact your score by up to 11 points each” and their removal was the “fastest way to

27 _____
 28 ²⁹ Petkovic also described the process in his Third Declaration (ECF No. 33, ¶¶ 13-14),
 which was filed after we had inquired about this issue in our interview.

1 boost your score;” sales rep asked consumer to select “the ones they don’t recognize or
2 that are not tied to an open account;” for the unrecognized inquiries, sales rep sought to
3 enroll them for “Inquiry Removal.” **Exhibit 3 at 8.** The script nowhere mentions
4 identity theft or how these hard inquiries would be challenged.

5 Hard inquiry disputes were offered at \$79 per dispute, but agents could offer a
6 “special promo” of \$79 for two disputes. For ten or more inquiries, agents offer \$799 and
7 free removal of extra inquiries above ten. We understand that dispute letters were sent
8 for “Identity Theft,” and Credit Glory entities lodged identify theft reports in the
9 consumers’ names on the FTC’s IdentityTheft.gov website.

10 In our interview, Petkovic reported that the Credit Glory entities’ standard
11 procedure was to categorize hard inquiries not recognized by the consumer as “Identity
12 Theft” which was part of their process. He also confirmed that sales reps never discussed
13 “Identity Theft” with consumers.

14 In one call we listened to, where the hard inquiry pitch was successful, the sales
15 rep proactively assisted the consumer to identify items that did not have an open account.
16 At no time were the words “Identity Theft” mentioned or was the consumer asked if they
17 were comfortable making an identity theft claim. This is also consistent with the notes
18 we reviewed for customers with “Inquiry Disputes” there was no indication consumers
19 understood they were claiming Identity Theft. For example, one Credit Glory customer
20 said her “motivator” was just to build better credit with no mention of identity theft.

21 2. Are These Fees Unlawful?

22 A critical issue for this receivership is whether these fees violate the Credit Repair
23 Organizations Act (“CROA”) Section 404(b) and the Telemarketing Sales Rule (“TSR”),
24 Section 310.4(a)(4)(2), both of which prohibit advance fees until the contracted work is
25 completed. A second related analysis is if the fee taken violates these laws and
26 regulations, what would be required to bring such fee collections into compliance. Those
27 issues are addressed, *infra*, at § H.2.

1 3. The Individual Defendants Understood the Risk of Unlawful Fees

2 Individual Defendant Brola understood that the business was based on unlawful
3 advance fees. For example, based on his emails, he tracked a CFPB case against credit
4 repair competitor Lex Law, in which the CFPB alleged that Lex Law collected unlawful
5 advance fees.

6 In May 2022, Brola wrote a prospective business partner that Lex Law had “been
7 in trouble for a decade” with the CFPB and highlighted his admiration for Lex Law’s
8 obfuscation efforts – as Brola put it, it was “[s]uper smart” of Lex Law to “split their
9 companies up in a way that it’s apparently hard to prove who’s who. Progrexion is the
10 parent company, some marketing company agency that owns Lexington Law, credit
11 repair.com, credit.com, credit.com, etc. The R2O sites could be theirs, could be an
12 affiliate, I’m sure there’s no way to find out. Super smart. get rich or die tryin!” *See*
13 **Exhibit 4 at 3.**

14 The CFPB prevailed in the Lex Law case and obtained a stipulated judgment
15 (\$3.8 billion) entered in 2023 after the federal district court determined at summary
16 judgment that Lex Law collected unlawful advance fees in violation of the TSR.³⁰

17 Lex Law was required to stop its telemarketing sales in August 2023. Brola knew
18 well what brought them down given his monitoring of the case. And the case was front
19 and center in the credit repair space more generally: for example, we found in Brola’s
20 email box a November 2023 “Compliance Update” from the American Association of
21 Consumer Credit Professionals about the Lex Law case stating unequivocally: “Credit
22 repair organizations that market or sell their services over the phone, irrespective of
23 whether they promise a specific result to consumers, must follow the TSR, including the
24 advance fee provision.” *See Exhibit 5.*

25 We have seen no evidence that Brola, the other Individual Defendants or
26 Receivership Entities, took any meaningful steps toward TSR compliance. Instead, Brola

27
28 ³⁰ *See generally* <https://www.consumerfinance.gov/archive/newsroom/cfpb-reaches-multibillion-dollar-settlement-with-credit-repair-conglomerate>

1 took advantage of Lex Law/Progrexion's demise – he told one vendor in August of 2023
2 (the month of the Lex Law judgment) that: "We're a bit overwhelmed right now with
3 Progrexion going under - a lot of their large affiliates are coming to us." **Exhibit 6.**

4 The Lex Law case was raised to the leaders of Credit Glory in May 2024 by the
5 Raymond James investment firm. During due diligence for a transaction, investment
6 banker Jonathan Knauss emailed "the CG Team"³¹ with "one follow-up question, which
7 is about the CFPB and TSR." He attached the judgment against Lex Law, referenced
8 "the attached settlement between Progrexion and the CFPB," and highlighted the
9 language prohibiting advance fees.³² See **Exhibit 7.** Knauss then wrote: "As we
10 understood it, CG bills for services after sending notes to credit agencies within 48 hours
11 of the customer signing up. This seems as though it violates the language in the
12 Progrexion settlement. What are we missing here? Thanks." Knauss was not missing
13 anything. Individual Defendant Liam Emery responded to Knauss with an unpersuasive
14 argument that the TSR did not apply to the Credit Glory business.³³ See **Exhibit 8.** It
15 appears that Raymond James passed on whatever potential investment opportunity Credit
16 Glory was pitching/seeking.

17 We found evidence that sales team members were concerned about the advance
18 fee issue. In June 2023, a consultant (named Anubis) hired by Credit Glory to train the

19 ³¹ The CG team included Individual Defendants Josh Curtis, Marko Petkovic, and Liam
20 Emery.

21 ³² Knauss summarized the TSR's advance fee ban as follows: "A credit repair
22 organization may not request or receive payment until (1) the time frame in which they
23 have reprinted all of the goods or services will be provided to that person has expired and
24 (2) they have provided the person with documentation in the form of a consumer report
from a consumer reporting agency demonstrating that the promised results have been
achieved, such report having been issued more than six months after the results were
achieved." *Id.* (errors in original).

25 ³³ Emery responded via email: "The Progrexion case was decided in a Utah District
26 Court, so it's not binding law in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. Regardless,
27 Progrexion made significant timeframe representations and promised specific and
28 unrealistic results. We do the opposite by promising nothing and reaffirming this with
required compliance statements. Because of this, we think we have a strong legal
argument that the specific provision that PGX was violating doesn't apply to us at all."
Notably, other than making the vague claim that the "specific provision" didn't apply to
them, Emery did not address the advance fee issue.

1 sales team reported back to David Naylor that he received negative feedback from
 2 employees on this issue: “They know *some* of the TSR and CFPB regulations to some
 3 degree and are wondering ‘how are we **NOT** going to be sued?’” **Exhibit 9** (emphasis in
 4 original).

5 **B. Sales Process**



6 Our review confirms a two-step sales process: customers are acquired through
 7 deception and internet trickery and those customers are then subjected to sophisticated
 8 sales tactics by sales reps incentivized to sell.

9 1. Customer Acquisition – Google Ad Deception

10 The business targets consumers with credit problems who are searching the
 11 internet for the debt collector or creditor who is the source of negative information in
 12 their credit report with the goal to pay the debt and resolve the issue.

13 Defendants deploy Google ads to divert/hijack the consumer’s real search from
 14 legitimate results and instead drive them to Defendants’ sales reps operating remotely
 15 across the country. When consumers view their Google search results, ads bought by a
 16 Credit Glory entity pop up with links to a phone number and a website.

17 If they click the phone number link, the call will be directed to a sales rep of a
 18 Credit Glory entity:



1 If they click the website link, they are sent to a webpage and a one-page ad in the
2 name of the original search, but a phone number to the Credit Glory sales reps.



**Got Allied
International Credit
Corp on Your Report?**


- Allied International Credit Corp is a debt collection agency and can drag down your score.
- Inaccurate items on your report can be disputed and often removed. You may not need to pay.
- Call now to learn the process of disputing inaccurate items on your report.

(855) 765-7013

Please Note: Glory Services is NOT a debt collection agency and we're not affiliated with any. We communicate on your behalf with collection agencies.

15 As a result of this Google ad internet trickery, consumers believe they are talking
16 to the debt collection agency or creditor they searched for on Google. And the Credit
17 Glory sales reps are specifically trained to maintain that deception. The sales script in
18 Credit Glory's CRM guides sales reps on implementation of this deception:

- 19 • Sales reps are instructed to avoid correcting consumers' misunderstandings
20 that they are speaking with a debt collector or collection agency. They are
21 instructed: "Very important to stick to the call flow and not give away that
22 we're not the CA." **Exhibit 10 at 3.**
- 23 • The CRM contains specific guidance on how to respond when asked
24 whether Credit Glory is in fact another company. When asked "Is this
25 ABC Collections?," they are instructed to "Agree" and "Amplify" with the
26 vague response: "We help with collections they place on your credit
27 report...So I can assist you" followed by suggested "Transitions" to move
28 the consumer toward enrolling in a plan. **Exhibit 11.**



- The sales reps are also told to give consumers the false impression that they can settle the consumers' debts and to then quickly redirect them to Credit Glory's repair services as a superior path. There were extensive discussions internally among the sales teams about mastering "the pivot." **Exhibit 12.**

We also located a Credit Joy script on its CRM that contained a slightly different but equally troubling introduction. That script's Phase I Section: Intro & Discovery provided specific instructions to sales reps to hide Credit Joy's identity: "Create a safe, neutral space without disclosing who we are," with the goal being to "build comfort" without "exposing details prematurely." **Exhibit 13.** The script then warned of the "Danger" that "[t]he caller may ask, Who are you? or assume you're the collection agency," instructing the sales rep thusly: "Do not confirm or deny—stay neutral." *Id.*

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1.1 | Intro**i About [hide]**

- Create a safe, neutral opening without disclosing who we are. It reassures the caller they've reached the right place and keeps the conversation controlled from the very first sentence.

Goal [hide]

- Immediately build comfort, get the caller talking, and establish yourself as the guide without exposing details prematurely.

⚠ Danger [hide]

- The caller may ask "Who are you?" or assume you're the collection agency.
- Do not confirm or deny — stay neutral.
- Correct statement: "We work with the collections that show up on your credit report."

We found an instance where a Credit Clerk sales rep was reprimanded by his manager for answering "No" when a consumer asked if he had reached Experian. The manager's email explained that instead of saying "No," the sales rep should pivot to offering help: "that pivot is everything. Instead of separating us from the solution, it should sound like: 'Oh man, getting an email about fraudulent activity can be scary: worried: Let me pull up your credit file and see if I can find anything suspicious or fraudulent in nature.' That keeps control and builds value. We cannot let those calls walk away." **Exhibit 14.**

A Slack discussion between two Credit Glory sales reps was also revelatory. When asked by a fellow sales rep how to respond to a consumer who thought they were calling a debt collector, a sales rep's recommendation was not to correct the misunderstanding, but to scare the consumer, "make [the consumer] feel like shit" and "don't be their friend UNTIL you pitch the dispute... until then you are mr collection agent." **Exhibit 15 at 10.**³⁴

³⁴ We found several candid assessments of the Credit Glory Receivership Entities by current remote employees in their Slack chats with one another. These were reflective of a digital high-pressure boiler-room where sales reps deceived consumers and sought to sell to the "\$978" leads (the highest among the companies' arbitrary price plans). For

1 We reviewed training materials in the CRM confirming the sales reps are trained
 2 in the science of consumer manipulation. A training video titled “Customer Mindset”
 3 tells sales reps to “understand [the consumer’s] mindset, know their walls, overcome their
 4 objections, make the sale.” The employee giving the training presentation explained that
 5 the consumers are apprehensive and think they are calling a debt collector: “Now, not
 6 only do they not know that they’ve called the wrong place; they think they’re talking to a
 7 company that wants to take their money or sue them or even garnish their wages, so how
 8 do you disarm somebody that’s feeling this way?” In response, the sales reps are told to
 9 “disarm” the callers with extreme confidence and promises to help them. If the consumer
 10 asks, “Is this ABC Collections,” the reps are told to deflect and confidently tell them,
 11 “Great Question, we do collections for them.” See **Exhibit 35** (Credit Glory Customer
 12 Mindset Training Video available at <https://shorturl.at/qrjh7>. This link will also be
 13 provided to the parties and a motion for leave to file an exhibit non-electronically will be
 14 filed shortly.)

15 The net effect of the Google ad trickery and sales reps’ deceptive responses is that
 16 consumers are confused – they think they are calling the debt collector or the creditor;
 17 and they do not really understand they have entered the Credit Glory sales apparatus
 18 where the goal is to get them to “pivot” away from paying off their debts and to paying
 19 Credit Glory to dispute negative credit report items. Such confusion was a consistent
 20 theme of consumers seeking refunds or cancellation.

21 //

22 _____
 23 example, in Slack discussion on August 10, 2026, two sales reps exchanged the following
 24 messages discussing the FTC lawsuit:

24 “Are you shocked”

25 “Eh not really I knew this was coming”

26 “lol yes it was always coming”

27 “Might not be a bad idea to pull your profile pic and delete last name just in
 28 case the ftc gets a hold of our slack. Might be extra careful but idk”

Exhibit 16.

1 Given the crucial nature of the Google ads in redirecting customers to the credit
2 repair companies, it is not surprising that the Google ad spend was the largest category of
3 vendor expenditures for Receivership Entities, with a total spend exceeding \$25 million
4 from 2022 through 2025.

5 2. Customer Acquisition – Organic Leads

6 While customer acquisition was primarily focused on Google ads connected to
7 debt collectors and creditor searches, the business also deployed Google ads for credit
8 repair services which included phone icons linking to the sales reps as well as direct links
9 to websites maintained in the names of the four credit repair entities. These websites
10 promoted success stories and positive reviews of credit score improvements and included
11 phone icons linking to sales reps.

12 We discovered that in spring of 2026, Credit Glory made a limited effort to
13 acquire customers through radio ads. We located a Slack message from Jessica Shuey,
14 Sales Director (who filed a declaration in support of the Opposition), to the sales team, in
15 which she touted that the radio ads lead to “organic leads” (customers who call in after
16 hearing the ads). She explained to the sales reps: “These types of calls need a different
17 approach – it’s all about transparency, they know who we are!” She also explained that
18 the script instructing sales reps to deceive consumers about who they were talking to was
19 “obviously” not needed. **Exhibit 17.**

20 3. Consumer Enrollment

21 Once the consumer has been unknowingly redirected to the Credit Glory sales
22 apparatus, sales reps muscle consumers toward a “plan” with immediate credit card
23 charges. The sales reps are trained and programmed to “make the deal” as their
24 compensation is tied to “plans sold” and “lead conversion” rates.

25 Our primary source for insight into the sales process was the CRM,³⁵ which
26 provides a centralized platform for the sales effort. It reflects a workplace structure
27 where customer interactions are heavily scripted with standardized responses. As to each

28 ³⁵ All four credit repair entities have almost identical CRMs.

customer, it provides a complete timeline of their interactions and all of their related documents.

The Collections Call Flow (**Exhibit 3**) walks the sales rep through the six phases of the Credit Glory “Call Flow Funnel”³⁶ with scripted language and specific rebuttals to consumer questions and objections. It is supported by the “Call Flow Mastery” (**Exhibit 10**) and the “Objection Handling Master” (**Exhibit 18**) which anticipates all manner of questions and objections. In aggregate, these documents reflect the core component of the sales pitch: disputing the debt with Credit Glory is a better option than paying it off:

The Call Flow Mastery Phase 2 (Education and Transition) highlights the need for sales reps to “educate” consumers that paying off the debt is not their best option:

- “The idea is to educate clients on the long-term impact paying off a collection may have on their credit score.” **Exhibit 10 at 3.**
- “We want to explain that paying the collection is the most common option consumers choose and that’s why they’re trying to reach the Collection Agency most of the time.” **Exhibit 10 at 3.**
- “We want to explain that paying the collection might make sense, but it’s not a good choice ...the balance will go down to \$0, but the collection can stay on their credit report for up to 7 years.” **Exhibit 10 at 3.**
- “We want to encourage the clients that disputing the collection is a better option. Successfully disputing the collection takes it off the credit report completely...” **Exhibit 10 at 3.**

The Collections Call Flow script feeds sales reps specific language on this this message:

- Phase 2 (Education and Transition) “But keep in mind when you pay the collection, the balance will go to \$0, but the collection itself will stay on your credit report for 7 years.” “The second option is a legal dispute for removal of the collection on your credit report. Quite often these collections have errors and, as per federal law, if these aren’t corrected by the bureaus, the account must be removed.” **Exhibit 3 at 2.**
- Phase 5 (Hook & Close) highlights that the goal is to get items deleted: “When the disputes are successful and the items get deleted, they disappear

³⁶ The six phases are: Intro & Discovery; Education and Transition; Standard Scores; Credit Consultation; Hook & Close; Wrap Up & Compliance. Each phase includes links to rebuttals to any consumer resistance.

1 from your report like they were never there and that's when your score
2 jumps back up where it should be." **Exhibit 3 at 4.**

3 The Master Objections provide canned objection responses inflating the chances
4 of actual success on the dispute:

- 5 • "I have a 95 % satisfaction rating on my disputes. I'm not willing to risk
6 that rating if I'm not confident, I'll be able to help you here today." Master
Objections Phase 4/5 Transition. **Exhibit 18 at 3.**
- 7 • "Not only would we not be in business if we weren't getting proven results
8 but on top of that we have a 95% satisfaction rating and 4.9/5 stars on
Trustpilot." Master Objections 4/5 Extra Statement. **Exhibit 18 at 3.**

9 **C. Credit Repair Services**

10 The primary service provided to enrolled customers is the sending of dispute
11 request forms to the credit reporting agencies. We understand that these letters were
12 computer-generated. The font used on the filled-out forms is designed to mimic a
13 consumer's handwriting. *See* **Exhibit 19, 20, 21.**

14 Our review suggests that these automated dispute forms were generated and then
15 emailed almost immediately after consumers uploaded their two pieces of required
16 information: identification (copy of driver's license); and proof of address. The Credit
17 Glory entities immediately billed the consumers' credit cards, on which Holds had been
18 placed earlier in the sales process, at the same minute they "processed" the letters by
19 transmitting the dispute letters to their third-party mail vendor (who then printed,
20 stamped, and mailed the letters to the credit reporting agencies). Our understanding is
21 that generation of the dispute letters is accomplished using an automated process that is
22 accomplished with little effort. While we do not have transparency into the actual
23 preparation of the letters, we believe that it requires but a few keystrokes, given how
24 quickly the letters are generated. Customer profiles on the CRMs reflect that these letters
25 are typically processed within hours, and sometimes minutes, of the consumers uploading
26 their information to the Credit Glory entities.³⁷

27 _____
28 ³⁷ As discussed elsewhere, it is doubtful whether the meager "services" of preparing auto-generated dispute letters constitutes "fully perform[ing]" the contracted-for services to justify collection of the set-up fees (whether it is \$179 or \$978); and second, the timing of

1 In our sampling of 50 customer accounts across the CRM systems of all four
2 Credit Glory entities, we identified several trends: the most common dispute reason listed
3 on these letters was “Unverified Account”, followed by “Address Dispute,” “Name
4 Dispute,” or “Identity Theft”; dispute letters were sent to the three credit reporting
5 agencies roughly once per month; we saw no specific methodology for which dispute
6 reason is listed; and multiple letters are sent for each customer, often using different
7 dispute reasons across those letters.

8 Our review of the CRM confirms that hundreds of thousands of letters were sent
9 out in the names of consumers – first in initial rounds of disputes followed by monthly
10 letters. At this point in our review, we cannot evaluate how many disputes were
11 successful. Many consumer complaints indicated dissatisfaction with the results, noting
12 that their credit scores did not improve, but most of that evidence is anecdotal.

13 Individual Defendant Petkovic has filed three declarations in support of
14 Defendants’ Opposition (while at the same time refusing to accept service). In our
15 interview with Petkovic, we asked him to explain the methodology and provide us with
16 access to the data for the metrics set out in his first declaration and exhibits. ECF
17 No. 30-5 at 2-3 & 11 (¶¶ 9-10 & Exs. A and F). Petkovic explained that a company team
18 had provided him with the information and he had few details beyond that. We requested
19 that he provide instructions on how we could access the data in the DigitalOcean platform
20 to verify accuracy of the claims. He indicated he was agreeable to doing so. Since the
21 time of our interview, Petkovic filed a third declaration, and just before we filed this
22 report, we received a follow-up letter from his counsel, which included information they
23 believe will allow us to access this data. Given that we just received this information, as
24 we were in the midst of completing this report, we have not been able to test the
25 instructions. As such, we do not know whether the figures provided in Paragraph 10 and
26

27 _____
28 the payments violates advance fee bans in the TSR and CROA. Those topics are
addressed elsewhere.

1 Exhibits A and F of his First Declaration are accurate. Based on our review of other data,
2 we have our doubts.

3 We are, therefore, not now in a position to evaluate whether and to what extent
4 individual customers secured actual credit repair.

5 **D. Unlawful Enrollment Practices**

6 TRO Sections I(D-G) specifically prohibit unlawful enrollment practices regarding
7 billing and disclosures about billing, including unauthorized charges, failure to provide
8 CROA disclosures, and unlawful negative option marketing. These prohibitions reflect
9 provisions in the CROA³⁸ and the TSR³⁹ designed to protect consumers from
10 unauthorized and unwanted charges that are hard to cancel.

11 Our review confirms that the Credit Glory entities' sales reps poorly disclose the
12 negative option billing at the heart of the business – *i.e.*, a \$99 monthly fee for credit
13 repair and then a \$24.99 monthly fee for credit monitoring services (Standard Services),
14 which kicks in after seven days if that contract is not canceled. Instead, the disclosures
15 about recurring charges are confusingly presented and buried at the end of a glossy
16 barrage of smooth talk from the sales representatives – and after the dispute resolution
17 services have been offered as a panacea to these consumers' credit problems.

18 Our review of Slack messages and sampling of sales calls both confirm that many
19 sales reps gloss over key disclosures that would prevent sales. In a recent Slack
20 discussion (May 22, 2026), two sales reps describe their interpretation of script language
21 requiring disclosures:

22 //

23 //

24 ³⁸ The CROA requires that written contracts include the terms and conditions of payment,
25 total amount of all payments, estimate of the date services will be completed or the length
of time necessary to perform the services. 15 U.S.C. § 1679(d).

26 ³⁸ The TSR requires that credit repair telemarketers disclose all material terms and
27 conditions of negative option features of sales, including the fact that consumers must
affirmatively act to cancel recurring charges. *See* 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(vii).

1 “The way I say it sounds good *I don’t mention no suing no guarantees of*
 2 *any outcome 99\$ a month indefinitely...* That’s on them though... It’s
 right there for them to read...”

3 “I tell them to read it over hit continue and the second pa[g]e is going over
 4 the 90-day guarantee and when I say that that already signed it...lol

5 “Yup they always sign like idiots... Bless them...”

6 “lol”

7 “Good night more suckers tomorrow it should be good since Monday will
 be dead...”

8 **Exhibit 22 at 4.**

9 As a result of the confusing and inadequate disclosures, consumers consistently
 10 complained they did not know they had signed up for recurring monthly charges
 11 indefinitely. For example:

- 12 • A Credit Glory customer complained: “Reason I gave them 1 star is bc I
 13 had to leave something to write this review, they sign you up for stuff and
 14 don’t even realize it til you’re getting emails. I even asked if I was getting
 signed up for subscriptions and she said ‘no mam’ they really suck!!! Don’t
 15 do it unless you’re wanting to pay 2-3 subscriptions!!!!!!” See ECF No.
 30-5 at 22.
- 16 • A Credit Sage customer complained: “They also put me into a t3-month
 17 agreement/contract and continued charging me. I asked them to cancel my
 agreement, but the charged continued.” ECF. No. 305 at 47.
- 18 • Standard Scores customers made consistent complaints including:
 - 19 ○ “I didn’t authorize this charge, never signed up for your services,
 20 and was defrauded by a credit recovery agent to use your services,”
Exhibit 23; and
 - 21 ○ “Nobody disclosed you were cheating me monthly and matter of fact
 after the scammer talked me into \$1 charge.” **Exhibit 24.**

22 **E. Refunds**

23 Customer dissatisfaction is reflected in a high volume of cancellations and
 24 refunds.

25 1. Cancellations

26 Defendant Marko Petkovic indicated that the average credit repair company
 27 consumer canceled in just two and one-half months. In his First Declaration he included
 28 an exhibit, Exhibit F, which includes the credit reporting companies’ cancellation rates in

the last year. These included a whopping 90% for Credit Joy, 58% for Credit Sage, 46% for Credit Clerk, and 40% for Credit Glory. As noted above, we have not been able to replicate these metrics, but the sheer number of cancellations (as calculated by the Defendants themselves) supports widespread consumer dissatisfaction.

2. Refunds

The CRM contained a specific platform for the Retention Team responsible for handling dissatisfied customers and instructions on how to handle refunds. Under the most recent policy (May 2026), refunds were evaluated by “threat” level – refunds were to be granted only if “client threatens us with CFPB, FTC, Lawyer and Attorney General.” The materials stated “no other threats count[.]” *See Exhibit 25*. Employees were instructed to be on the lookout for certain “government regulatory agencies/law references” and other “legal trigger words”⁴⁰ that required escalation to the “Complaints Team.” *See Exhibit 26*.

Employees had some flexibility to negotiate with consumers posing less of a threat (like a BBB complaint), but the “set up fee” was considered non-negotiable. While it appears that some refunds on the \$99 monthly fees were granted, our review confirms that the refund process was onerous and many consumers complained.

F. Consumer Complaints

Our review identified a steady flow of customer complaints and cancellation requests submitted by various means.⁴¹ Samples of such complaints are attached as **Exhibit 27**; they reflect consistent themes of fraud and unauthorized charges.

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⁴⁰ This list included: CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); FTC (Federal Trade Commission); CROA (Credit Repair Organizations Act); CRA (Fair Credit Reporting Act); Authorities; Attorney; Lawyer; Sue; and Lawsuit.

⁴¹ Complaints were made through email, phone calls, hand-delivered mail, Better Business Bureau and Trustpilot complaints, complaints to state regulators, the FTC, and the CFPB.

1. Complaints about Credit Glory, Credit Sage, Credit Clerk, and Credit Joy

These Receivership Entities received dozens of BBB Complaints and 1-star Trustpilot reviews, many emailed directly to the inboxes of Individual Defendants Brola, Petkovic, and Naylor. For example:

- On July 28, 2026, one outraged Credit Glory consumer posted a Trustpilot review detailing how Credit Glory scammed him out of \$1,000 on a \$330 debt that was still on his credit report 9 months later. **Exhibit 27 at 1.**
- Another consumer complained on July 21, 2026, that Credit Glory was “[the worst] credit repair company every don't trust it's a fraud and waste of money and time called every month for updates and nothing but they continued to charge and that 3 months free is also a lie they don't do that don't waist your money with them.” **Exhibit 27 at 3.**
- A few days earlier (on July 13, 2026), a consumer had warned: “After realizing that this company is not what they projected themselves to be, I find i am out \$978. The agent led me to believe he was going to pay off my Kohls charge as well as dispute it on my credit report. they are deceptive...be careful.” **Exhibit 27 at 4.**
- A former employee of Credit Joy and Credit Glory wrote the following 1-star review: “CREDIT JOY/CREDIT GLORY I WORKED THERE AND GOT TIRED OF FRAUD AND STEALING MONEY FROM POOR PEOPLE. THIS IS A SHITTY COMPANY.” **Exhibit 27 at 5.**
- One consumer sent a 1-star review of Credit Sage in December of 2024: “These people are scammers; they will keeping charging you and not rending service. They are thieves, they will tell you that once you pay it will take 45 days and they won't do anything. Credit sage will keeping charging you and tell you that they are still waiting for a merchant and you will be charged again and again.” **Exhibit 27 at 6.**
- An October 2024 1-star Trustpilot review of Credit Clerk stated: “Was misled. Thought I was talking to Experian. Associate never told me it wasn't. So many time I said Experian. He never said it wasn't.” **Exhibit 27 at 7.**

In July of 2026, David Naylor received an email from the Chief Revenue Officer of Identity IQ (which was a vendor who provided access to credit reports much like Standard Scores for Credit Glory, Credit Sage, and Credit Joy) to flag that Identity IQ was receiving complaints from consumers confused about what they were signing up for. **Exhibit 28.** The email identified 78 separate complaints over the past two months and

provided a “breakdown” of the categories of complaints.⁴² *See id.* It appears that the purpose of the email was not to send alarm bells to Credit Clerk that a fraud was afoot, but rather to position Identity IQ to pitch its chargeback tools to reduce complaints and chargebacks.

The Receivership Entities request that happy customers post favorable Trustpilot reviews, usually immediately after the first call with a sales rep (when the consumers may or may not understand that they have not been speaking with the creditor they intended to contact). *See Exhibit 29.*

But even with the Receivership Entities priming the pump to get five-star reviews, there are many scathing reviews – generally after the consumers progressed further in the process and realized they had been billed by someone other than the creditor, or even later once they had paid the Receivership Entities substantial funds with no results. Given what appears to be manipulation of the reviews by the Receivership Entities, we do not give much credence to the Trustpilot reviews as evidence of consumer satisfaction. We observed that Brola monitored the 1-star reviews, attempted to have some of them

⁴² Vendor Identity IQ specifically identified and quantified the following categories of complaints they had received about Credit Clerk:

- Impersonated a credit bureau (Experian, Equifax, TransUnion, or the bureau) ~33.
- Impersonated a collection agency or creditor the customer was trying to reach (LVNV, I.C. Systems, Jefferson Capital, Portfolio Recovery, etc.) ~25.
- Impersonated some other company (Credit Karma, a loan company, a healthcare agency) ~5.
- Enrolled the customer without consent / customer unaware they were signed up ~20.
- Failed to disclose the trial and recurring monthly subscription (told “\$1 only”) ~15.
- Bad or falsified contact data (misspelled emails — possibly intentional to block the welcome email – bad SSN/DOB/phone) ~6.
- Charged separate fees (\$99–\$149+) or promised credit-repair results not delivered ~6.
- Irate customers / escalation threats (FBI, BBB, bank, bureaus) ~10.

removed, and was suspended by TrustPilot on multiple occasions through Cease and Desist notices for misusing TrustPilot's flagging tool. *See Exhibit 30.*

2. Complaints about Standard Scores

Our review of numerous sources (the inbox for the hello@standardscores.com email address, mail delivered to the Standard Scores Richmond office, BBB and TrustPilot reviews, etc.) revealed rampant complaints about Standard Scores. These consistently raised similar issues regarding the unauthorized recurring \$24.95 monthly subscription charges, poor disclosures, and misrepresentations about whom consumers were speaking to; they often referred to Standard Scores as a "scam" or a "fraud." *See generally Exhibit 31.*

For example:

- In November 2025, one customer canceled Standard Scores noting that the \$24.95 monthly charges had gone unnoticed for a year as it was "Small enough to miss yet BIG enough to not settle for it being okay and leaving it go unaddressed." The consumer said that he was investigating the 10 charges of \$24.95 since December of 2024 and unless someone could show that he had signed up he was "filing criminal charges of theft" as "the information online is pointing to a blatant scam and theft through deceptive practices." **Exhibit 31 at 39;**
- In June of 2026, one customer emailed: "I didn't authorize this charge, never signed up for your services, and was defrauded by a credit recovery agent to use your services. This is notice to cancel the account immediately; a hard refusal of your services, and I'm requesting a full refund. I've notified the BBB of the transaction and reported the information as an internet scam to the IC3 internet crimes division. I have also forwarded the information to my attorney." *Id.* at 8; and
- Many complaints/cancellations were made in the week before the TRO was entered.
 - On August 5, 2026, one consumer canceled, stating:

"Nobody disclosed you were cheating me monthly and matter of fact after the scammer talked me into \$1 charge I told him I did not want your services! You won't get another penny from me." *Id.* at 1.
 - On August 4, 2026, another wrote:

"stop! This is Fraud!" *Id.* at 2
 - On August 3, 2026, one customer emailed:

"This is FRAUD. Cancel immediately!! I am filing a police report if you do not refund..." *Id.* at 3.

1 These complaining consumers were by no means outliers, given that we found hundreds
2 of emails dating back several years from upset consumers canceling because of
3 unauthorized charges, misrepresentations, and fraud by Standard Scores.

4 **G. Common Enterprise**

5 The four credit repair companies (Credit Glory, Credit Sage, Credit Clerk, and
6 Credit Joy) and Standard Scores operated as a common enterprise. The credit repair
7 companies' business models are the same. The CRMs and training materials are identical
8 with minor variations in Credit Clerk.

9 While Standard Scores was created on paper as a separate company, it was an
10 embedded part of the four Credit Glory companies, all controlled by Brola. Standard
11 Scores' inclusion in the enterprise was critical – it enabled sales reps to view credit
12 reports for a \$1 with the added benefit of immediate access to consumers' credit card
13 information. It too was part of the common enterprise.

14 All Standard Scores sales are tainted by the initial misrepresentations made to
15 consumers who thought they were speaking with the debt collectors or creditors for
16 which they had originally searched. Standard Scores had few employees and it does not
17 appear the company generated income from any source other than the initial consumer
18 calls coming into the Credit Glory entities. The CRM for all the Credit Glory entities had
19 links to Standard Scores. The Credit Glory sales reps handled all payments to and
20 contracts involving Standard Scores.

21 Defendant Joshua Curtis is Standard Scores' 100% owner and "CEO" on various
22 corporate documents, but we found no evidence that he performed any functions beyond
23 attempting to get merchant processing for the Receivership Entities, where he continually
24 claimed to be the owner of Standard Scores.

25 **H. Can the Business Be Operated Legally and Profitably?**

26 The initial investigation by our receivership team has enabled me to evaluate the
27 ability of the Receivership Entities to comply with numerous provisions in the TRO and
28 to reach the opinions expressed herein regarding the legality and profitability of business

1 operations. Although I have not been able to access certain materials, I do not believe
2 that further information is needed to reach these opinions. Specifically, our review to
3 date provides a basis to evaluate the legality of three key components of the business and
4 determine if the business could operate legally and profitably if those practices were
5 brought into compliance.

6 1. Misrepresentations in Customer Acquisition

7 Customer acquisition is primarily premised on customer confusion created by
8 deceptive Google ads (and then reinforced by sales reps) that lead consumers to believe
9 they are talking to the debt collector or creditor for which they initially searched. *See*
10 **Exhibit 32.**

11 To be compliant, the business would require a wholesale change in its customer
12 acquisition strategy. Google ads could not be deceptive and confusing – they would have
13 to be redesigned to make it clear that the Credit Glory entities are not the debt collector or
14 creditor for which the consumers searched, but different companies entirely.

15 Sales reps would have to be retrained to tell consumers the truth – *i.e.*, that they
16 are not talking to their debt collector or creditor, but instead to a credit repair company
17 that will not help them pay off their debts but only help them dispute them. If a
18 consumer asks, “Are you ABC Collections?”, the answer must be: “No. We are a
19 different company.” If a consumer asks, “Can you help me pay off my debt with ABC
20 Collections?”, the answer must be, “No, we are not able to help you with payments to
21 ABC Collections. You must call them directly to do so.”

22 Sales reps would also require retraining to remove a core deception at the root of
23 the business: that disputing a debt is always a better option than paying it
24 because payment does not take the debt off your credit, but a successful dispute will
25 remove it forever. Sales reps make this claim without clarification that disputes are only
26 successful if the debt or other negative item is not legitimate.

27 Such removal of the deception and misrepresentation now embedded in the sales
28 process would materially reduce sales volume. Implementation of a compliant sales

operation would also be complicated, time-consuming, expensive, and unprofitable. On this basis alone, this business could not be operated legally and profitably. This reality is an independent basis for immediate suspension of operations.

2. Unlawful Advance Fees

These parties chose to operate in an environment highly regulated to protect consumers. The statutory language of the federal advance fee prohibitions in the CROA and the TSR can be obtuse, but the concept is clear – protect vulnerable consumers from bad actors who promise future results but demand payment in advance.

As Receiver, I could not continue this business legally without complete conviction that the fees collected complied with these advance fee prohibitions and any other applicable federal and state laws. For the reasons discussed below, I lack that conviction.

a. CROA Advance Fees

CROA Section 404(b), which is incorporated in TRO Section I.B, prohibits advance fees defined as: “Charging or receiving money or other valuable consideration for the performance of any **Credit Repair Service** before such service is **fully performed.**” *Id.* (emphasis added).

A first step toward compliance is to determine what “Credit Repair Service” the consumer contracted for and whether a fee was paid before that service was “fully performed.” The Credit Joy “Product & Policy Knowledge Cheat Sheet” (“Policy Cheat Sheet”) (**Exhibit 33**) we located on the CRM describes Defendants’ view of CROA compliance as follows:

First billing for Credit Repair plan is processed **only after dispute letters are** sent, typically within 1-24 hours after the contract is signed. This is in accordance with the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA) we must complete the work before billing the client and we are unable to process payments before work is completed (Thus is why the service is non-refundable, because we do the work before charging the client).

However, a hold will be placed once the contract is signed to ensure that the money is available to be charged once work is completed. A hold (also known as an authorization) is legally not a charge and does not break the CROA as it does not take the money out of the client’s account. Only once the work is complete is the hold released and a charge made...

1 *Id.*

2 This interpretation has the rule right – no payment until the work is completed but
 3 suggests an unrealistic definition of the work (“dispute letters are sent”).⁴³ The logical
 4 extension would be this disclosure to consumers: “Our Credit Repair Service is the
 5 sending of a single batch of automated form dispute letters; once that is done, our service
 6 has been ‘fully performed’ and we can collect our fees without it being an unlawful
 7 advance fee.”

8 Our review of other CRM materials and listening to calls with consumers suggest
 9 that “send a first round of dispute letters” is not a legitimate description of the service
 10 consumers think they are contracting for and is not wholly consistent with the actual
 11 business and what is pitched to consumers. Defendants’ own documents describe
 12 multiple other “services” that consumers may believe they are going to receive. For
 13 example:

- 14 • The same Policy Cheat Sheet describes the “Credit Repair Program” as a
 15 process, not just a single round of letters: “a complex and sometimes
 16 lengthy process that is achieved by sending itemized dispute letters to each
 bureau. We send a new round of dispute letters to each bureau every 30-35
 days using unique and personalized strategies...” **Exhibit 33 at 1.**
- 17 • The Policy Cheat Sheet also defines “work completed”: “Enrollment
 18 completes when all negative information has been deleted, changed to a
 favorable report (no longer Derogatory) Or the client cancels.” **Exhibit 33**
 19 **at 4.**
- 20 • Phase 5 (Hook & Close) of the Collections Call Flow highlights that the
 21 goal is to get items deleted: “When the disputes are successful and the
 items get deleted, they disappear from your report like they were never
 22 there and that’s when your score jumps back up where it should be.”
Exhibit 3 at 4.
- 23 • Hook & Close also highlights that the “first round of dispute letters” is just
 24 the beginning: “To get everything started, there’s a one-time setup fee of
 \$x78 which covers preparing and sending your first round of dispute letters
 25 within 24 hours after authorized payment. From there we keep working on
 your file, month-to-month, which is just \$99 per month as we continue to
 26 apply pressure until the job is done.” **Exhibit 3 at 4.**

27
 28 ⁴³ Other internal documents invoke the language “first round of dispute letters.”

- 1 • Phase 6 of the Collections Call Flow offers a guarantee: “In the rare case
2 you haven’t seen any removals after 90 days, you’ll receive an additional
3 90 days of service completely free.” **Exhibit 3 at 5.**
- 4 • Master Objections Phase 1 “Last Ditch Attempt” highlights that the goal is
5 removal: “Our goal is to ensure that we REMOVE any inaccurate
6 information that could be hurting your credit. Many of our clients have a
7 score INCREASE within just 90 days.” **Exhibit 18.**
- 8 • The Services contract itself is vague, defining services to include “credit
9 consulting, dispute management, and a unique customer portal to track your
10 credit history.” **Exhibit 34.**

11 Just these few examples confirm there is a predicate factual issue as to what is the “Credit
12 Repair Service” and when it is “fully performed.”

13 Even accepting Defendants’ description of services as just the “initial mailing of
14 dispute letters,” the customer is charged before that narrowly-defined service is “fully
15 performed” – first, the hold is placed on the card during the first call and then the card is
16 charged after the customer delivers identification and address confirmation with the first
17 round of dispute letters to follow within 24 hours. As such, the set-up fees and the
18 subsequent monthly charges appear to violate CROA even under the narrowest definition
19 of the services because they have not “fully performed” their services when they place a
20 hold on a consumer’s credit card and then bill that card – which occurs after dispute
21 letters have been prepared but before they have been printed and mailed out by the direct
22 mail vendor.

23 The Credit Glory entities could, in theory, avoid this advance fee violation by
24 stopping the practice of placing holds on credit cards during the cancellation period and
25 wait to contact them for payment until the dispute letters have actually been mailed by
26 their third-party mail vendor. Such a delay would impact cash flow, though only by a
couple of days, but it would be subject to the increased risk that the credit card payments
could not be processed because the consumer had withdrawn authorization or did not
have credit eligibility.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Getting the credit card charge authorization was a consistent problem during the initial call. Banks apparently flag the Credit Glory companies as a fraud charge and sales reps have to routinely coach consumers on how to contact banks and get the charges authorized. A two-or-three-day gap for the charge to be imposed would likely involve

1 For purposes of this Preliminary Report, my report to the Court is that this
2 business does not appear to be compliant with CROA and that any future compliance
3 effort would require factual determinations as to what the credit repair services are and
4 when they are fully performed.

5 b. The TSR's Advance Fee Prohibition

6 TSR (Section 310.4(a)(4)(2)) goes further than the CROA by prohibiting the
7 collection of advance fees "until six months after the consumer is provided
8 documentation that the promised results have been achieved."

9 Whether these fees violate TSR is not a complex question. The set-up fee and the
10 subsequent monthly charges are collected well before the six-month time frame in the
11 TSR. And Receivership Entities do not send consumers any documentation, which
12 would be needed to start the six months running in the first place. This violation could
13 not be remedied without delaying collection by six months and installing a
14 documentation procedure that triggered the six-month timer. Such a paradigm shift
15 would require a completely different business plan with additional capital and financing.
16 The Credit Glory entities do not claim they comply with the TSR but have presented a
17 legal argument that the provision is not constitutional and does not apply to them. In the
18 role of temporary Receiver, however, I must accept the law as is and cannot recommend
19 a return to operations for a business that so clearly violates the TSR.

20 As to Standard Scores, it is portrayed as a separate credit monitoring company,
21 which does not claim to provide credit repair services. As such, the \$1 collected by the
22 Credit Glory entities for Standard Scores in the first call and the subsequent monthly
23 charges could be argued to not be subject to CROA or the TSR. However the reality is
24 that Standard Scores is operating as part of a Common Enterprise with other credit relief
25 companies and, as such, its collection of fees would violate the TSR.

26 //

27 _____
28 substantial consumer contact and coaching at a time when consumers routinely cancel the
services.

c. The CROA's Other Provisions

The current procedures violate numerous other requirements of the CROA: the consumer has a right to cancel within three “business days” from signing the contract; there is a mandatory cooling-off period of three business days from signing the contract during which “No services may be provided by any credit repair organization for any consumer;” and there are requirements for specific disclosure of the right to cancel and the cooling-off period in separate written statements and/or in the terms and conditions of the contract.

Receivership Entities violate these provisions as follows: by providing services during the cooling off period (during which they prepare and send dispute letters to their mail vendor); by omitting mandatory contract language of “Notice of Cancellation” within 3 business days of contract signing to be in the immediate proximity of the signature line; by identifying the right to cancel as within “3 days” rather than the required “3 business days;”⁴⁵ by omitting mandatory disclosure of the 3 business days cooling off period; and by violating other notice requirements.

The above violations of the CROA could be remedied: the contract could add the mandatory language of cancellation within “3 business days,” rather than “3 days”; the Credit Glory entities could wait to perform any services during the three-business-days cooling-off period; and their contracts could be amended to include the mandatory bold-face disclosures as specified in the CROA.

But such changes would have a severely negative impact on the business.

3. State Laws

Many States have advance fee prohibitions similar to federal law. Some states impose separate – and more stringent – requirements for credit repair organizations. Some States, such as Georgia, have criminal penalties for illegal advance fees and failing

⁴⁵ This materially reduces a consumer’s cancellation rights. If a contract is signed on a Friday, 3 business days would extend to the following Wednesday, but 3 days just to Monday.

1 to register without required surety bonds.⁴⁶ Although we have not undertaken a state law
 2 compliance review, we have not seen indications that the Receivership Entities sought to
 3 comply with state law in their contracts or otherwise. The need for compliance with
 4 States' separate legal regimes poses an additional hurdle to any resumption of this
 5 business.

6 4. Unlawful Enrollment Practices

7 As detailed in Section IV.D, above, the Credit Glory entities have violated the
 8 billing practices prohibited in the TRO.⁴⁷ These unlawful enrollment practices could be
 9 corrected by requiring sales reps to disclose what exactly is being sold *before* any money
 10 is collected and exactly how/when that money will be collected. Truthful disclosures that
 11 consumers are signing up for indefinite recurring charges totaling \$125 each month
 12 would dramatically reduce sales.⁴⁸

13 * * *

14 I conclude that these three components of the credit repair business could not be
 15 brought into compliance without a complete recasting of the business model. As such, it
 16 is my determination that the business could not operate legally and profitably in the
 17 context of this receivership. I have, therefore, suspended operations. As to Standard
 18 Scores, while there is nothing inherently unlawful about a business that provides credit
 19 reports for a fee, Standard Scores is part of an unlawful common enterprise whose
 20 customers are all derived from deception and misrepresentations, and its monthly fees
 21

22 ⁴⁶ See e.g., Georgia Code § 16-9-59 ("Operation of Credit Repair Services
 23 Organizations"); California Civ. Code § 1789.10-1789.26; Texas Finance Code Chapter
 24 393); Ohio Credit Services Organization Act (ORC Chapter 4712). For instance,
 California and Arkansas residents are provided with a cancellation protection of five
 business days.

25 ⁴⁷ TRO Sections I(D-G) prohibit three categories of unlawful enrollment practices
 26 regarding billing and disclosures about billing; unauthorized charges; failure to provide
 CROA disclosures; and unlawful negative option marketing.

27 ⁴⁸ This could include the \$1 collected by Standard Scores. The business could decide not
 28 to charge the dollar, instead obtaining the consumer's permission to access their credit
 reports for free.

1 violate the TSR. Hence, I do not see a path for it to operate legally and profitably, and I
2 have therefore suspended its operations.

3
4 Dated: August 26, 2026

By: 

Thomas W. McNamara
Temporary Receiver